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Abstract
Inflation expectations play a significant role in determining inflation outcomes,
through price and wage-setting behaviour, and their accurate measurement is of
key importance to monetary policy, which is forward-looking. There are a
number of measures of expectations available to policy makers, from both
survey and financial market data. This article provides an overview of the main
ones for the euro area and outlines the caveats that must be taken into account
when analysing each one. The various measures should be seen as
complementary and their interpretation based on a clear understanding of their
limitations. The article also includes an overview of recent trends in measures of
inflation expectations.
1 The authors are economists in the Monetary Policy and International Relations Department and Financial Markets Department respectively. The
views expressed are not necessarily those held by the CBFSAI or the European System of Central Banks. The authors would like to thank
Maurice McGuire, Ronan Hickey, William Molloy, Tom O’Connell and Gerard O’Reilly for their very useful comments during the drafting process.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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1. Introduction
Inflation expectations are a key component of
the inflation assessment and are, therefore,
central to the formulation of monetary policy.
They play an important role in the wage and
price setting behaviour of workers and firms
and, thereby, feed directly into inflation
outcomes. Inflation expectations also play a
key role in economic models used by central
banks, such as those based on the New
Keynesian approach as well as the Taylor Rule,
which suggests monetary policy responses to
changes in inflation and output. They also
provide a useful cross-check for a central
bank’s own assessment of the inflation outlook.
Despite the importance of monitioring inflation
expectations, their measurement is imperfect.
There are several key measures monitored by
policy makers, from both survey and financial
market data. This article focuses on the main
indicators of inflation expectations available in
the euro area, namely the ECB’s Survey of
Professional Forecasters, the European
Commission’s consumer survey, and implied
inflation rates derived from euro area inflation-
linked bonds and inflation swaps. HICP futures
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange are also
examined. Each measure has advantages and
disadvantages and policymakers tend,
therefore, to analyse a broad range of
indicators to come to an assessment of where
inflation expectations lie.
Analysis of available data shows that inflation
expectations over the shorter term tend to
reflect the current economic situation, including
commodity price and exchange rate
movements, while longer-term expectations
tend to reflect macroeconomic structures and,
in particular, the credibility of monetary policy.
Well-anchored medium to longer-term inflation
expectations allow the monetary authorities
more leeway in maintaining a stable policy
stance in the face of shocks that impact on
demand and supply, such as recent oil price
volatility and financial market turmoil.
The economic literature has yet to develop a
consensus view as to how individuals form
inflation expectations, but there are two
significant approaches: adaptive and rational
expectations. Under adaptive expectations,
inflation expectations today are based on a
weighted average of past inflation outcomes.
Under rational expectations, it is assumed that
individuals are more sophisticated, processing
all available information in forming their
expectations, including a knowledge of how the
economy works.
2 Recently, there has been a
move away from the assumption that
individuals are completely rational and focus
has been on the costs of collecting and
processing information. There seems to be
some consensus in various studies that
information processing is costly and that it
might not make sense for some people to
undertake this task (Sims, 2003) or to do so
only infrequently (Mankiw & Reis, 2002). The
findings from psychology also suggest that
individuals use rules of thumb and heuristics to
reduce information processing costs. There is
also substantial evidence that, as individuals
learn, the performance of their expectations
significantly improves when compared
retrospectively with actual inflation outcomes.
Research in this area is still evolving, however.
This article focuses on the relative strengths
and weaknesses of each of the main indicators
of inflation expectations in the euro area.
Section 2 focuses on survey measures and
examines both surveys of professional
forecasters and consumers. Section 3
concentrates on financial market measures and
covers those derived from inflation-linked
bonds and inflation swaps. Section 4 examines
data and results relating to these measures in
recent years, while Section 5 concludes.
2 In econometric terms, this means that forecast error cannot be
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Table 1: Main Measures of Inflation Expectations
Survey Horizons Frequency Sample size/liquidity
Professional Forecasters
ECB Survey of Professional This and next calendar year, one Quarterly 59 on average — lower for
Forecasters and two years ahead, 5 years ahead, probability distribution
probability distribution
3
Consensus Economics This and next calendar year, Monthly/ 29
6 and 10 years ahead Biannual
Euro-Zone barometer This and next calendar year Monthly/ 23
4 years ahead Quarterly
Consumers
European Commission One year ahead Monthly 23,000
consumer survey
Financial markets
Implied rates from inflation Focus normally 5 and 10 years Daily Moderate liquidity
indexed government bonds ahead
Inflation swap derivatives Focus normally 1 to 10 years ahead Daily Moderate liquidity
HICP derivatives 1 to 13 months ahead Daily Illiquid
2: Survey measures
Survey indicators can be seen as the most
direct measures of inflation expectations as
they put specific questions to particular groups
designed for this purpose. Results are therefore
directly observable rather than inferred. These
surveys can also provide measures of
uncertainty surrounding expectations, with
questions covering perceptions of the
probability of inflation falling within certain
ranges in the future, thereby providing a
probability distribution. For the euro area, the
ECB’s survey of professional forecasters and
the European Commission’s consumer survey
are the main focus of attention. Other groups
are covered to varying extents in other surveys,
including other economists and academics.
There are several limitations to survey data,
however, with, most notably, a scarcity of
evidence for a number of key economic
groups, such as the inflation expectations of
price-setters in the economy, a problem
highlighted by US Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke
4, or the inflation expectations
that feed into wage settlements. Other
disadvantages of surveys include their periodic
publication, so that it is difficult to assess the
3 The results from a survey question as to the probability of inflation
lying within specific ranges. This provides an indication of the
degree of uncertainty surrounding a mean inflation forecast.
4 Bernanke (2008).
impact of incoming economic news and, when
actual inflation is volatile, the picture can easily
change in the time between conducting the
survey and publishing the results. In addition,
survey measures can be imprecise due to a
range of other issues, principally incomplete
information among respondents or low sample
sizes.
2.1 Professional forecasters
Surveys of professional forecasters should in
theory be more accurate than consumer
surveys, as the respondents are experts for
whom estimating future inflation is part of their
jobs and, unlike consumers, where being
proved substantially wrong may have a
reputational cost. This also enables surveys to
be more detailed than consumer surveys and
to provide point estimates of future inflation for
a number of different time horizons. These
include long-term expectations, which are
widely seen as a measure of central bank
credibility, reflecting how well expectations are
anchored at the central bank’s inflation target.
The ECB survey of professional forecasters
(SPF) is the most complete, with the broadest
range of indicators, the largest sample size and
a probability distribution. In practice, the mean
forecasts, where comparable, are quite similar
to other surveys, namely those of Consensus
Economics and the euro zone barometer
published by the European Commission.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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Chart 1b: One Year Ahead SPF
Forecasts
Mean forecasts in the ECB survey have been
generally close to the Eurosystem target of
below, but close to, 2 per cent. This has,
however, resulted in systematic
underestimation of inflation almost since the
survey began in 1999 as actual outcomes have
been somewhat higher. Furthermore, Bowles et
al (2008) find that the degree of
underestimation is higher than for SPF
forecasts of GDP growth or employment. This is
largely due to developments in energy and,
more recently, food prices, which have
consistently exceeded prices in commodity
futures markets and so can legitimately be
seen as surprising. Yet when these prices are
excluded, the median response still fails to
forecast a significant increase in underlying
inflation in 2001-02 and a smaller increase in
2004.
This suggests that mean forecasts do not
contain the full information and that measures
of uncertainty might provide a more complete
picture. In practice, however, obtaining a
measure of uncertainty surrounding inflation
expectations is highly problematic. One
possible measure of uncertainty is
disagreement between survey respondents,
which can be measured, for example, by the
standard deviation from the point estimates, i.e.
the average distance between each
observation and the mean of all point
estimates. The extent of disagreement in
surveys of professional forecasters is
considerable but D’Amico and Orphanides
(2008) find only a weak link between
disagreement and inflation uncertainty as
suggested by estimates of uncertainty derived
from inflation-linked government bonds.
Another useful indicator is the proportion of
respondents that think inflation will exceed 2
per cent, as this can be seen as a test of
whether forecasters think the ECB will meet its
objective. The main problem is that this
indicator excludes much of the information in
the survey.
To utilise information over the entire survey,
efforts have been made to draw conclusions
from the whole probability distribution provided
by respondents. This should in theory provide
targeted measures of uncertainty, as
respondents are asked to assign specific
probabilities to inflation lying within certain
ranges. The small sample size is a problem,
however, exacerbated by the fact that not all
respondents provide full probability
distributions. Furthermore, any change in the
composition of the panel of respondents from
one period to the next can have a major
impact.
A simple indicator from this distribution is the
probability that inflation will lie between 1.5 and
2.4 per cent; in other words, close to the ECB
target of below, but close to, 2 per cent, shownMeasuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area












Q4 2008 Q3 2008
2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2 1.9 1.8 1.7
Chart 2:     Chart 2: SPF Probability Distribution for Inflation 5 Years Ahead
in Chart 3. The probability distribution assigns
a lower estimate to the likelihood of inflation
lying within this range than point estimates.
This indicator suggests that inflation
expectations have become more anchored
over time and, in particular, since early 2004.
This may be attributable to the announcement
in the second quarter of 2003 that the ECB
target for inflation would not only be ‘‘below’’
but also ‘‘close to’’ 2 per cent. It may also
relate more generally to the accumulation of a
track record for the ECB, which passed its five-
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Chart 3: Probability of Long-Term Inflation Lying between 1.5 and 2.4 per cent
complex measure is the standard deviation of
probability distributions, which utilises all the
information in the distribution. A problem with
this measure, however, is that respondents are
only asked to assign probabilities to ranges so
that there is no information as to how
probability is distributed within that range.
Assumptions have to be made in this regard
and results can vary according to these
assumptions.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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Table 2: Measures of Inflation Expectations and Uncertainty Using 5-year Ahead Forecasts
Historical Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
average 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008
Average of point estimates 1.90 1.93 1.95 1.95 2.03 1.99
Uncertainty measures using point estimates
Standard deviation 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.11
(disagreement measure)
Probability of inflation above 43.9 48.4 48.7 50.4 56.9 57.0
2 per cent
Uncertainty measures using probability distribution
Standard deviation 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.53
Probability of inflation between 66.6 73.9 71.6 71.2 68.0 68.0
1.5 and 2.4 per cent
Recent experience suggests that these survey
measures of inflation uncertainty have delivered
a mixed performance. Inflation fluctuated
widely in 2008 and it would be very surprising
if uncertainty had not been elevated for some
of the time. As will be seen in section 4,
financial market measures imply, however
imperfectly, that inflation uncertainty was
indeed quite elevated for, at least, a significant
part of the year. The survey measures of
uncertainty, however, while indicating some
upward pressures, were mostly quite muted,
particularly relative to their long-term averages,
as shown in table 2. Only the most basic
measure, the proportion of point estimates
above 2 per cent, clearly indicated a
pronounced increase and this was partly driven
by an increases in actual expectations, as
shown by the average of point estimates. On
balance, analysts tend to gravitate somewhat
towards a focus on point estimates.
Nevertheless, though imperfect, these
measures are the only direct measures of
uncertainty available.
2.2 Consumer surveys
Consumer surveys reflect the opinions of those
who directly feed into the inflation process
through wage demands and responsiveness to
retail prices. Furthermore, consumer spending
accounts for 57 per cent of euro area GDP.
The results of these surveys can be
compromised, however, by a couple of factors.
First, respondents tend not to have the same
ability to process information and forecast as
those for whom such analysis is part of their
jobs, such as financial market agents and
professional forecasters. A critical aspect of
this would appear to be an information deficit,
with survey results suggesting that many
consumers might be simply not aware of the
actual rate of inflation. Second, respondents do
not have the same incentives as others to
correctly estimate inflation, as there is no
reputation or other cost to being proved wrong.
For example, a Eurobarometer survey
published in April 2008 suggested that, on
average, EU citizens believed the inflation rate
to have been 4.8 per cent in 2006, even though
published actual rates averaged 2.3 per cent.
Perceptions of actual inflation are distinct from
forward-looking expectations but such failings
raise doubts over consumers’ understanding of
inflation.
There is some evidence, however, that
suggests consumer perceptions can
significantly improve through learning. This
indicates potential for central bank
communication to influence expectations,
provided it is clearly communicated and widely
reported in the media. Anderson (2008), using
point estimates from the U.S. University of
Michigan consumer survey, shows that
responses are quite poor when respondents
are interviewed for the first time but improve
markedly when a second interview is
conducted some time later. Respondents make
some effort to learn about inflation between first
and second interviews though there is also
some selection bias as one-third of
respondents refuse second interviews.
The experience of the changeover to euro
notes and coins in 2002 provides some insight
into what factors might drive a wedge betweenMeasuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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consumer perceptions and actual outcomes.
The European Commission indicator of
consumer perceptions of price trends over the
previous 12 months had a strong relationship
with actual inflation up to the changeover, as
shown in Chart 4. Inflation perceptions
increased very sharply in early-2002, and did
not return to near pre-changeover levels until
early-2005, despite clear and persistent
evidence to the contrary in official statistics. In
fact, a Eurostat study in June 2002 showed that
most of the exceptional price increases over
the first six months of the year were more
temporary for the most part, due to the impact
of bad weather on food prices, further
increases in oil prices and increases in
tobacco taxes. The euro changeover was found
to have added, at most, 0.2 percentage points
to the headline inflation rate. Explanations
centre on the notion of an information deficit
and costs to processing information. First, it
appears that practically all price increases in
early 2002 were blamed on the euro and that
consumers put too much weight on smaller
items purchased frequently. Second,
Greitemeyer et al (2004) found that a priori
expectations were difficult to change;
consumers had a firm belief that the euro
would lead to price increases before the actual
changeover and even contrasting evidence in
official data was not enough to change it. Third,
a number of studies, including Ehrmann (2006),
found that countries with more complex
conversion rates showed more evidence of
price increases in smaller items and higher
consumer perceptions of inflation.
Consumer expectations have nevertheless
been remarkably stable in recent years in the
face of sharp increases in energy prices. For
most of the period since 1985, inflation
perceptions and expectations moved in
tandem, as shown in Chart 5. Since 2002,
however, perceptions of price trends over the
previous 12 months have been much higher
than expectations, indicating that consumers
were more forward-looking. This was most
pronounced after the introduction of the euro,
with consumers apparently viewing perceived
euro-related price increases as transitory. More
generally, energy prices have been on an
almost continuous sharp upward trend from
2002 to mid-2008. Consumers appeared to
have faith, however, that each price increase
was transitory, i.e. would not lead to second
round effects on other prices. This view was
fully in line with a strong commitment from the
ECB that such second round effects would not
be accommodated and, moreover, persisted
even in the midst of almost continuous energy
price increases. From mid-2007 to mid-2008,
however, energy prices soared and were,
moreover, compounded by record increases in
food prices. In the event, inflation expectations
increased significantly from late 2007 and, by
mid-2008, had risen to uncomfortable levels,
before declining sharply in line with commodity
prices.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
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Chart 5:  European Commission Consumer Survey — Price Trends
Food prices seem to play a particularly strong
role in shaping consumer expectations. Even
more so than energy, food is perhaps
associated in the public mind with the cost of
living and is the source of the greatest number
of individual purchases. As Chart 6 suggests,
food prices can explain almost 60 per cent of
fluctuations in consumer expectations. This is
despite the fact that sharp food price increases
tend to dissipate quite rapidly, and the ECB
























































































second round effects from food and energy
prices. Between late-2007 and mid-2008,
consumer perceptions of inflation over the
previous 12 months rose by much more than
expectations but this was more attributable to
very high readings in the former. This suggests
that consumers may have viewed some food
price increases as transitory but nevertheless
substantially overestimated the impact on
inflation, causing some spillover into
expectations.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
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2.3 Performance of both types of survey
The overall picture from various studies, though
mixed, is that the forecasting performance of
professional forecasters and consumers is
quite similar, even though professional
forecasters should, in theory, be more
accurate. There are a number of possible
reasons for this. First, the sample size for
surveys of professional forecasters, though
covering more of the available population, is
much smaller. Second, there might be different
costs to over- or under-estimating inflation for
forecasters, as suggested by Capistra ´n and
Timmermann (2008), related to what the
forecast is being used for, e.g. portfolio
allocation. Finally, these studies are mainly
based on comparisons between the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s survey of
professional forecasters and the Michigan
consumer survey and so benefits from the
learning process that consumer respondents
seem to undergo between first and second
interviews.
3: Financial market measures
The growth in the market for inflation-linked
financial products in recent years, particularly
in Europe, has provided a variety of alternative
sources for monitoring inflation expectations.
These sources offer several advantages over
surveys. Financial market measures summarise
the views of a large number of well-informed
market participants, whereas survey data of
professional forecasters reflect the views of a
limited number of respondents. Financial
market measures are also available at a real-
time frequency, rather than periodically.
There are various caveats that must be borne
in mind when analysing financial market
measures of inflation expectations, however, as
these measures are subject to a number of
biases. These biases are difficult to observe
and may be positive or negative depending on
their nature. This has been of particular
relevance in recent months when financial
market dislocation has given rise to large
distortions in market measures of inflation
expectations. It must also be noted that it is
difficult to assess the predictive power of
market-based inflation expectations over an
extended period as the relevant financial
instruments were typically only introduced
following the introduction of the euro and
market liquidity was initially low.
5
In this section, the two principal sources of
financial market measures of inflation
expectations are examined: inflation-linked
bonds and inflation swaps. The various
limitations and biases of these measures are
detailed. We also look at the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange’s Euro HICP futures
contract.
Inflation-Linked Bonds
An inflation-linked bond is a bond with principal
and coupon payments linked to a price index,
thus eliminating inflation risk for investors. The
holder of a conventional bond is not
compensated for inflation and therefore the
yield on this type of bond is referred to as
being ‘nominal’. By assuming that efficient
markets will arbitrage between nominal and
inflation-linked bonds, it follows that the
difference in the yields on these two bonds (of
the same maturity) will be market participants’
expectation of average annual inflation to the
bonds’ maturity. This measure is referred to as
the breakeven inflation rate and is one of the
most commonly referred to measures of
inflation expectations. It is the theoretical rate of
inflation at which both of these bonds would
give the same return if held to maturity.
Inflation-linked bonds were first issued in the
UK and Australia in the early 1980s, with
countries such as Canada, Sweden, France
and the US issuing similar bonds during the
1990s. There is currently a wide-range of
inflation-linked bonds available in the euro
area, including those issued by Greece, Austria
and Germany, in addition to those already
mentioned. However, bonds issued by the
French Treasury are generally used in the
calculation of break-even inflation expectations
for the euro area due to their higher degree of
liquidity and larger range of maturities. These
bonds are generally linked to euro area HICP
excluding tobacco, though French HICP ex-
tobacco is also used as a reference index.
While breakeven inflation rates are a simple
and timely method for calculating inflation
5 ECB (2006).Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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Chart 7:  Breakeven Inflation Rates for Selected French Inflation-Linked Bonds
expectations, they are subject to a number of
distortions due to the existence of various
premia in the market for inflation-linked bonds.
For this reason, breakeven inflation rates may
not always accurately reflect market
participants’ inflation expectations. The main
premia are as follows:
— Inflation risk premium: While investors in
inflation-linked bonds are compensated
for changes in the rate of inflation during
the lifetime of the bond, holders of
conventional nominal bonds are not.
These latter investors therefore require an
inflation premium in order to hold these
nominal bonds. However, as the outturn
for future inflation rates is uncertain, this
inflation premium will include a risk
premium to compensate for this
uncertainty and this premium will vary
over time.
6 The breakeven inflation rate
will incorporate this additional premium,
positively biasing the breakeven rate and
causing it to overstate market
participants’ inflation expectations.
— Liquidity premium: Liquidity in the
market for inflation-linked bonds is
generally lower than liquidity for
conventional nominal bonds. This is due
to a number of reasons, such as the fact
6 It is difficult to accurately estimate the magnitude of this inflation
risk premium and estimates vary depending on the econometric
model employed.
that investors in inflation-linked bonds
tend to hold them to maturity. The
differential in liquidity will be exacerbated
during times of financial market stress,
when investors generally prefer to hold
more liquid assets. This results in a
liquidity premium being embedded in
breakeven inflation rates, and the
premium can be difficult to measure as it
depends on day-to-day financial market
developments. This liquidity premium will
generally negatively bias the break-even
rate, as inflation-linked bond holders will
need to be compensated for additional
liquidity risk. The liquidity premium has
been an important factor in the analysis of
break-even inflation rates during the
current financial market turmoil due to
extreme flight-to-quality flows into nominal
bonds and reduced liquidity in the market
for inflation-linked bonds.
— Another liquidity issue that can impact on
breakeven rates is the limited amount of
issuance of inflation-linked bonds, in
comparison with conventional nominal
bonds. This situation can lead to sizeable
changes in prices in the inflation-linked
market when there are large fluctuations
in demand. A final liquidity issue is
differing demand for so-called ‘‘on-the-
run’’ and ‘‘off-the-run’’ bonds. The most
recently issued bonds for a given maturityMeasuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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are referred to as ‘‘on-the-run’’ bonds and
these can be subject to higher demand
than ‘‘off-the-run’’ bonds, leading to a
differential in yields and, therefore,
differing breakeven inflation expectations
depending on which type of nominal
bond is used in the calculation. This
factor is of particular significance for the
US market, where certain investors prefer
to hold ‘‘on-the-run’’ bonds.
— Other factors: A variety of other technical
factors may distort breakeven inflation
rates, such as current market conditions,
differentials in tax treatment for inflation-
linked and conventional bonds, and
seasonal patterns in the HICP rate.
7
Another distorting factor is that euro area
inflation-linked bonds generally use HICP
excluding tobacco as a reference rate.
This tends to lead to a small negative
bias in euro area break-even inflation
rates, as the overall HICP rate (including
tobacco) has generally been higher than
the ex-tobacco rate.
Inflation Swaps
An inflation swap is an over-the-counter
contract between two parties who agree to
exchange a fixed flow of payments for a
variable flow linked to an inflation index, such
as the euro area HICP index. Increased
liquidity in the European inflation swap market
in recent years has meant that policy makers
have paid increased attention to this market in
order to monitor financial market participants’
inflation expectations.
The contractual arrangement for an inflation
swap is as follows: one investor agrees to pay
a stream of fixed payments in return for a
stream of floating payments. The floating
payments are linked to an official inflation
index. The investor who agrees to make fixed
payments is referred to as an ‘‘inflation buyer’’,
while the investor making the floating payments
is referred to as an ‘‘inflation seller’’. For a zero
coupon inflation swap, a net payment is made
7 Seasonality will have the greatest impact on short-term break-even
inflation rates. This issue is examined in the ECB working paper
‘‘The Term Structure of Euro Area Break-Even Inflation Rates: The
Impact of Seasonality’’ (Working paper 830, November 2007).
at the maturity of the swap, while for a multi-
payment swap a payment is made each year.
The zero coupon swap can be used to
calculate the average expected inflation rate for
the lifetime of the swap, comparable to
breakeven inflation rates derived from inflation-
linked bonds.
Inflation swaps were first introduced during the
1990s and were principally used as a means of
transferring risk between investment banks and
their clients. Since then, a wider range of
contracts has become available and an active
secondary market has developed. The
European market for inflation swaps has
increased significantly since the introduction of
the euro, and liquidity in this market is now
comparable to that of the inflation-linked bonds
market. One of the main driving factors behind
this development has been the presence of
institutions that need to hedge against low
inflation (such as utility companies and large
retailers, whose revenues are closely linked to
inflation) and others that need to hedge against
high inflation (such as pension funds and life
insurance companies, whose liabilities are
linked to inflation). In the US, the market has
not developed to a comparable level due to the
relative absence of market players, especially a
lack of investors willing to purchase inflation
risk. As with inflation-linked bonds, the French
market for inflation swaps is the most liquid in
Europe and the most commonly used to
calculate inflation expectations. French
contracts generally reference euro area HICP
ex-tobacco or French HICP ex-tobacco.
The large range of maturities of inflation swaps,
in comparison to the inflation-linked bond
markets, has made this a particularly attractive
source of inflation expectations for analysts and
policy markets. The availability of contracts at
constant maturities over time also means that
swaps are comparable over different periods,
making it possible to look at movements in the
swap curve in order to see whether
expectations have moved up or down. This
also allows for the construction of an inflation
curve, similar to an interest rate curve, for
different periods. Chart 8 shows inflation curves
for three different days during 2008. The
changing position of this curve indicates thatMeasuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
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Chart 8: Inflation Curves Derived from Inflation Swaps
Years
inflation expectations for all maturities initially
rose during 2008, but subsequently fell, in line
with falls in commodity prices. The changing
slope of the curve indicates that longer-term
expectations were more stable than shorter-
term expectations, with near-term expectations
falling particularly sharply between June and
December.
As inflation swaps are issued at a variety of
maturities, it is possible to calculate forward
inflation rates, i.e., what market participants
expect inflation to be over a certain period of
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Chart 9: Five-Year Forward Rates in Five Years Time
policy makers to eliminate short-term volatility in
the inflation swap market in order to look at
market participants’ longer-term expectations of
inflation. For example, the five-year forward rate
in five years time (commonly referred to as the
five-year five-year rate) shows investors’
expectations for annual inflation over a five-year
period starting in five years time. It is derived
from five-year and ten-year swap rates. These
calculations can also be undertaken for
inflation-linked bond yields, but the wider range
of maturities available in the inflation swap
market means that a more in-depth analysis
can be performed.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
Quarterly Bulletin 01 / January 09 80
As with break-even inflation rates, the use of
inflation swaps in the analysis of inflation
expectations is also subject to a number of
caveats. An inflation curve derived from
inflation swaps will generally be upward
sloping, indicating the presence of term
premia. This appears logical, with inflation
uncertainty increasing over longer horizons,
causing inflation sellers to demand a higher
risk premium. An inflation swap can also be
subject to counterparty risk, a situation that will
not be as significant in the market for inflation-
linked bonds due to the fact that the issuer is a
sovereign. Counterparty risk can be offset
through the posting of collateral, however.
While it is generally not possible to estimate the
magnitude of these distortions, both effects
have a positive bias, causing expectations
derived from inflation swaps to overstate
market participants’ actual inflation
expectations. The quoted prices of inflation
swaps cannot, therefore, be interpreted as
direct measures of market participants’ inflation
expectations. Market prices may also be
affected by demand-supply dynamics,
especially in markets where there are
structurally more investors willing to sell
inflation than willing to buy inflation.
Comparison of inflation breakevens and
inflation swaps
Inflation expectations derived from inflation-
linked bonds and inflation swaps generally give
a similar picture of market participants’ view on
future price developments, and term and
inflation risk premia should bias both measures
in the same direction. Deviations may arise,
however, due to the different time frames of the
two instruments. Inflation breakevens refer to a
period that is changing over time, i.e., the
period between the current trading date and
the maturity date of the bond, while an inflation
swap has a fixed start and maturity and is
quoted for a fixed period of time. Inflation
swaps are also more at risk of being distorted
by short-term demand-supply dynamics due to
weaker supply in this market. In the inflation-
linked bonds market, regular issuance by
sovereigns provides the market with a
consistent inflation buyer. Finally, financial
market dislocation can also give rise to
differing measures of inflation expectations
from the inflation-linked bond and inflation
swap market, as has recently been the case.
CME measure
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)
introduced the Euro HICP futures contract in
September 2005.
8 This contract tracks
annualised monthly developments in euro area
HICP for twelve calendar months and is based
on the unrevised euro area HICP ex-tobacco
index, as published by Eurostat.
9 Due to the
relatively high degree of liquidity in the
European market for inflation-linked products, it
was expected that this product would be used
as a means for market players to hedge their
inflation risk, as well as for speculation.
However, the market for the CME product
remains illiquid, with little day-to-day
movements in prices and little underlying
trading activity. It is therefore to be expected
that inflation expectations derived from these
future prices are subject to a significant
liquidity premium and it is probably not, as yet,
a useful measure.




As has already been noted, both survey and
financial market measures of inflation
expectations tend to show volatile short-term
expectations but more stable longer-term
expectations, and this has proved to be
indicative of actual inflation outcomes. Broadly
speaking, up to 2007, short-term expectations
preceded significant changes in underlying
inflation, which excludes energy and food
prices, though longer-term expectations
reflected a belief that these would proved
short-lived, as turned out to be the case in
2001-02 and 2004-05. From early 2007, there
were stronger indications of accumulating
inflationary pressures in all measures and, in
the event, wage increases began to accelerate
8 A US CPI futures contract was launched by the CME in February
2004.
8 A US CPI futures contract was launched by the CME in February
2004.
9 The CME has published a guide to the Euro HICP contract, which
can be found on the CME website.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
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Chart 10:  Some Short-Term Measures of Inflation Expectaions
from the middle of the year. In the first half of
2008, all of the main indicators suggested a
marked increase in inflation expectations while
wage increases continued to accelerate.
Subsequently, the impact of a sharp and rapid
deterioration in the economic outlook,
particularly regarding commodity prices,
saw higher inflation expectations quickly
dissipate.
Developments up to the middle of 2008 show
the particular importance of crosschecking
measures of inflation expectations. Higher
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Chart 11:  Some Long-Term Measures of Inflation Expectations
to be driven significantly by inflation
uncertainty, and possibly liquidity issues. The
strong parallel movements in financial market
measures between countries and regions
suggested a common external driving factor,
most probably oil prices, and the subsequent
unwinding of expectations as oil prices
declined sharply would appear to confirm this.
Though unwelcome, perceptions of increased
upside uncertainty regarding inflation are
preferable to an increase in actual
expectations. Survey measures also increased,
but not by as much as financial market
measures, adding weight to the argument thatMeasuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
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inflation uncertainty and liquidity issues played
a role in causing financial market measures to
rise. Overall, the various measures suggested
an upward movement in inflation expectations,
though probably not by as much as suggested
by financial market measures.
Developments in the second half of 2008 also
underline the necessity of crosschecking
indicators and of understanding the
weaknesses of various measures. The declines
in some financial market measures during this
period reflected to some degree the unwinding
of elevated inflation expectations and
uncertainty that risks might be on the upside.
The extent of these declines and the
contradictions between measures pointed to
the predominance of liquidity issues, however,
with extreme safe-haven flows into nominal
government bonds leading to highly distorted
breakeven inflation rates. Balance sheet
deleveraging on the part of financial institutions
also contributed to distortions of breakeven
rates, with a general sell off in the less liquid
inflation-linked bonds market driving up yields
on these bonds. Similarly, dislocation in
derivatives markets, due partly to the exit of
several major players
10, led to distortions in
inflation expectation readings from the inflation
swap market. In this environment, the message
from consumer surveys was generally more
reliable, suggesting a smaller but still
substantial decline in expectations.
4.2 Recent research
A number of researchers have used long-run
inflation expectations to draw conclusions as to
the extent to which inflation expectations are
anchored. These studies are mostly US-based
but, for the first time, a study, Beechey,
Johannsen and Levin (2008), compared survey
and financial market data on long-term
expectations in the US with those in the euro
area. The interesting finding is that short-term
economic fluctuations have an impact on long
run inflation expectations in the US but not in
the euro area. This suggests that euro area
expectations may be more firmly anchored. The
paper concludes that this may be attributable
10 The bankruptcy of Lehman brothers led to generalised disruption
in derivatives markets, as did uncertainty over the future of US
insurance group AIG.
to differences in communication strategies
between the ECB and the US Federal Reserve,
namely the fact that the ECB has a quantifiable
inflation target for the medium term. The US
Federal Reserve also has a more explicit dual
objective based on both price stability and
employment. This conclusion is not without
qualification, such as, for example, difficulties
in measuring the impact of economic news on
inflation expectation measures. This illustrates
quite well how inflation expectations can be
used to arrive at potentially quite far-reaching
conclusions but also how these conclusions are
subject to the usual caveats pertaining to
measures of inflation expectations.
5. Conclusion
Measures of inflation expectations are a key
data input in the formulation of monetary policy
since, of its nature, monetary policy must be
forward-looking. While there are now various
measures of inflation expectations available to
policy makers, none of them are free of
problems. Survey data, which are stable and
generally perform well in comparison with
actual inflation outcomes, are based on small
sample sizes and are not available at a high
frequency. It is also difficult to extract a
measure of inflation uncertainty from these
data, with psychological studies suggesting
that individuals find it very difficult to provide
confidence intervals. Financial market
measures, based on inflation-linked bonds and
inflation swaps, are available on an intraday
frequency and reflect the views of a large
number of market participants. However,
measures of inflation expectations derived from
these financial instruments are subject to a
range of premia embedded in required returns,
and can be distorted during times of low
market liquidity.
For these reasons, the various survey and
financial market measures of inflation
expectations should be seen as
complementary and their interpretation should
be based on a clear understanding of their
limitations. A crosscheck of survey and
financial market measures is, therefore, most
likely to provide the most complete picture
available.Measuring Inﬂation Expectations in
the Euro Area
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